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ABSTRACT 
The paper is devoted to the influence of ‘market fundamentalism’ on the Russian agrarian policy in 1992 
- 2006. On the basis of analysis of two stages of economic and agrarian policy is concluded that "mix" of 
‘market  fundamentalism’  and  some  pragmatism  has  not  allowed  achieving  sustainable  growth  of 
agricultural production. Resource potential of the agriculture is reduced by high rates, however there is an 
essential increase of an economic efficiency: the expenses for unit of gross agricultural production in the 
comparable prices are reduced by rather high rates. In the future the forms of the state support of the 
agricultural  producers  should  help  to  provide  the  profitability,  which  is  necessary  for  extended 
reproduction in zones of commodity manufacture. 
1. WHAT WERE THE EXPECTATIONS FROM THE REFORMS? 
In the period before the start of the market reforms in the USSR (1987-1991), most economists had a 
fairly clear distinction between the objective and the means of the reforms, including between those of 
agrarian  reforms.  The  objective  was  to  build  a  sustainable  growing  agrarian  sector  that  increases  its 
efficiency by introducing innovative technologies. The means was to create a mixed economic system 
based on private property, numerous forms of enterprises, properly functioning competitive markets with 
a regulating role of the state. The key words characterizing the objective are sustainable growth and 
increasing efficiency. After fifteen years of reforms in the Russian agriculture, it can be stated that the 
basic institutions of market economy have generally been established. Since 1999, after seven years of an 
unprecedented decline of production, there has been a certain increase, both in the economy in general 
and in the agrarian sector in particular. However, this growth in agriculture has not been sustainable. The 
average rate of  gross output growth in agriculture in 2002-2005 was 2 per cent and mostly in plant 
production, while the real rates of increase in the incomes of the population exceeded 6-8 per cent. There 
is a certain efficiency growth, and we will focus on the indicators of this growth in due course. We will 
also mention here that employment at large enterprises is decreasing by about 10 per cent each year, the 
decrease in cultivated areas being 4-5 per cent a year.  
What is then the reason that sustainable growth has not been achieved? Why the efficiency has   largely 
been growing at the expense of reducing resource potential, i.e. of dying out of the weakest enterprises?! 
In our opinion, the main reason is that an appropriate system of governmental regulation has not been 
formed, including a system of regulating agriculture. It is the practice based on the ideology of ‘market 
fundamentalism’ (MF) well established in the Russian state governance that prevented such system from 
emerging. What do we mean by ‘market fundamentalism’ then?! 
2. WHAT IS ‘MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM’? 
‘Market fundamentalism’ as a term is widely used by J.Stieglitz in his work on the negative aspects of 
globalization, although no specific definition thereof is given.
1. However, it is clear from the text of the 
cited work that what is meant is a concept that overestimates the possibility of market relations and 
competition as such and underestimates the regulating role of the state, including that of creating a well-
balanced system of institutions that would help the economy to function for the benefit of sustainable 
development and in the interests of all population of the society.  
With this in mind, we treat ‘market fundamentalism’ approximately as the following point of view on the 
necessity of numerous institutions of modern market economy and the role of the state: for a normal 
development and functioning of modern market economy it is sufficient to ensure the existence of private 
                                                 
1 At first this term appears in the book in connection with a criticism of the belief of the International Monetary Fund’s 
decision makers in the positive impact of privatization, irrespective of creating conditions for effective work of future private 
enterprises. Quoted by the German edition: Joseph Stiglitz, 2002. Die Schatten der Globalisierung. Siedler Verlag, Berlin. 
2002. 304 S., с. 75. (Original issue Globalization and its Discontents. 2002. W.W. Norton & Co., New York. 2002). Further on 
Stieglitz says that Russia faced a change of religions with Marxism replaced by the new religion of free market (P.220). “At 
the same time, it is widely agreed that the state makes an important contribution to the formation of productive and humane 
society and economy” (P.251)  
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property rights and protection thereof, as well as competition. The main task for the state is exactly to 
protect private property rights and competition. The social task of the state is also to ‘pick up the fallen 
and the deceased’ in competitive activities, i.e. to provide only a minimum level of social support. 
 
The  fact  that  modern  market  economy  is  itself  a  complex  system  of  institutions  coordinating  and 
supporting producers, with the role of utmost importance among these institutions is being that of the 
state that develops and implements a concept of development, monitors international and internal sectoral 
markets  and  creates  an  environment  for  sustainable  development,  is  not  taken  into  account  by  the 
supporters of MF. The MF supporters also pay little attention to the idea that the state should promote a 
regular  functioning  of  the  markets  by  means  of  disseminating  market  information,  implementing  a 
sensible customs policy, regulating financial system, including banking system, etc.
2 With regard to the 
transition process, MF insisted on single-stage, ‘shock’ way of price liberalization, on fastest privatization 
possible  and  ignoring  the  ‘social  costs’  of  the  reforms.  In  fact,  for  the  market  fundamentalists  the 
objectives and the means were mixed up, as the objective for them was a maximum expansion of the 
market sphere, and not at all finding a solution to certain socio-economic issues.    
3. “MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM” AND THE CRISIS OF 1998 
Market fundamentalism was to a large extent responsible for the decline of production output in Russia 
between 1992 and 1998, when the GDP decreased by 40 per cent, industrial production – by 52 per cent, 
and gross agricultural production – by 42 per cent
3. Trying to harness the inflation caused by a single-
stage  price  liberalization,  the  government  proceeded  from  the  principle  of  minimizing  the  state 
influence and minimizing the circulation of cash resources. Therefore it opted for a sharp decrease in 
state expenditures that had been supporting the centralized economy by state orders. The economy started 
to decrease rapidly. Later on the government would practice massive non-payment of its debts to the 
enterprises for already accomplished (!) state orders. Financing of science and the social sphere was 
sharply reduced. Apart from cutting expenditures, there was a permanent practice of long-standing, for up 
to 6-8 months, arrears in the state paying its debts, including wages in the social sphere and payments for 
production orders. This excessive compression of cash resources in circulation could by itself cause a 
sharp and unmanageable decline of production, as well as a decrease in the incomes of the majority of the 
population. However, this was accompanied by hasty privatization processes, which, with hyperinflation 
in mind, led to further disorganization of economic links. 
 
According to the logic of ‘market fundamentalism’, financing of the social sphere on the part of the state 
was not aimed to compensate the losses in wages of the employees of this sector or to finance its quality 
development, which resulted in its impoverishment and a massive decrease in the quantity and quality of 
social services, as well as to a collapse of the corresponding sectors. 
 
Privatization was accompanied by a jump in the growth of differentiation in wages. Wages of enterprise 
directors and top managers exceeded the average wages at the enterprise by hundreds and thousands of 
times, while the withdrawal of the state from any control in the sphere of income distribution resulted in 
an almost triple decrease in the purchasing capacity of the population compared to the pre-reform period. 
It is obvious that with such a decline in customer demand and the state demand the economy could not 
avoid the ‘vicious circle’: decline in the economy – decrease in the incomes of the population and taxes – 
decrease in demand – decline in the economy and so on. 
 
                                                 
2 Stieglitz says it is impossible to introduce capitalism in both fast and successful way at the same time, without building a 
fundamental institutional infrastructure. Giving an example, he says that before creating stock exchanges, it is necessary to 
establish a corresponding framework of general economic conditions, including a system of genuine, not would-be, banks that 
would need, in their turn, a separate legal framework. Another his example of this is the Russian agricultural producers that, in 
the market conditions, should have an opportunity to purchase resources and sell their products without difficulties (and losses 
– D.E.), as well as a system of social institutions. Joseph Stieglitz, 2002, P.167. 
3 Russian Yearbook of Statistics - 2001. M., 2001.     4 
This vicious circle was aggravated by a decrease in production efficiency resulting from a fall in the 
scale of production and its disorganization. By 1998 over 90 per cent of agricultural enterprises and over 
53 per cent of industrial enterprises were unprofitable.  
 
Another negative aspect of ‘market fundamentalism’ could be seen in the sphere of currency policy. With 
the objective of fighting the inflation, the government was maintaining the exchange rate of the rouble to 
US dollar at the level of 5-6 roubles per dollar for two and a half years. From the end of 1994 and until 
mid-1998 the dollar exchange rate grew by 1.75 times, although the consumer price index and the average 
prices of Russian producers increased by 4 times. Within this period, starting with 1995, the exchange 
rate of the dollar was at the level of 5-6 rubles to a US dollar. However, this did not stop the inflation, 
while the competitiveness of Russian goods, compared to the cheeping imports, faced a sharp decline by 
1998, which furthered a deepening in unprofitability and a decline of production. Tax proceeds shrank, 
and the capacity of the government to repay foreign currency loans decreased. At the same time, the 
government attracted more loans, having issued state bonds with the appalling interest rates of up to 100 
per cent. They were repaid by new loans with even higher interest rates. Finally, this ‘financial pyramid’ 
collapsed, and the dollar exchange rate grew up from 6  to 21 rubles per US dollar within the period from 
August till December 1998, i.e. by more than three times. 
4. NON-PAYMENT, BARTER, MUTUAL OFFSETS OF DEBTS AND ‘RED DIRECTORSHIP’ 
In the situation of enormous deficit of cash resources created by the above-mentioned circumstances, 
enterprises became unable to provide for timely payments for the  goods delivered. Mutual delays in 
payment reached six months and even more. Such arrears should have led to an increase in the number of 
bankruptcies, but this was not happening. Domestic and foreign advocates of ‘market fundamentalism’ 
believed this is going on due to the bad will of ‘red directors’ that intend to make the country collapse due 
to  their  non-payments,  thus  ‘discrediting  the  progressive  reforms  and  the  reformers’.  They  were 
demanding  a  stricter  legislation  on  bankruptcies  and  an  expansion  of  state-initiated  insolvencies. 
However, in this situation the state itself should be declared bankrupt as the main non-payer of its debts, 
which was exactly what happened in the end (the bankruptcy of the Russian government in August 1998).  
The behavior of the enterprises seldom going to the court of arbitration against the companies in debt can 
be considered fairly rational. Indeed, in case an enterprise in debt goes bankrupt, there was a strictly fixed 
order of paying debts. Debts to the suppliers were not considered a priority. The chances of receiving any 
compensation from the bankrupt were slim. But the debtor was ready to pay with the products it was 
producing or, for instance, with raw resources available. In full compliance with the exchange nature, in 
the lack of a unified means of payment, any goods available may become such means of payment. The 
negative sides of barter are fairly obvious. The exchange proportions in case of barter include transaction 
costs related to the necessity of further series of exchange to obtain the needed goods or cash. In this 
situation the risks are increasing. This results in a significant distortion of market signals and reduces 
production efficiency. However, on the part of the enterprises, this was a fairly rational response to the 
irrational functioning of the institutional system. 
 
Regional authorities and heads of regions were trying to relieve the social situation in order to provide 
enterprises with an opportunity to sell their products and the workers – to receive their wages. Therefore 
in  many  regions  systems  of  mutual  offsets  were  established  that  made  it  possible  to  partially  settle 
interpayments. Sometimes these systems were based only on offsets in goods. Sometimes it was sufficient 
to allocate a small amount of money and to wire it through the long chain of non-payments in order to 
repay all these payments in chain.  
 
‘Market  fundamentalism’  advocates  treated  this  use  of  barter  and  mutual  set-offs  as  ‘an  attempt  to 
reestablish natural distribution and a Soviet-type power over the producers in the region’. Yet, in our 
view, this was a fairly rational and socially responsible reaction of regional authorities to the deadlock 
created by the inadequate economic policy at the federal level. It was not by pure accident that after the 
crisis of 1998 and a change of the monetary policy in favor of a more pragmatic one, barter and mass non-
payments disappeared within two years.   5 
5. MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BEFORE 1998 
In terms of the agrarian sector, ‘market fundamentalism’ resulted in: 1) a decrease in the level of tariff 
protection down to one of the lowest in the world, in combination with an overstated ruble exchange rate; 
2) a refusal, in the situation of high disparity of prices for industrial and agricultural production
4, to 
establish  any  legally  institutionalized  and  stable  system  of  state  support  of  agriculture  with  clear 
objectives; a decrease in support per hectare down to a radically lower level than in developed countries. 
  
The economically unjustified support of the dollar exchange rate at the level of 5-6 rubles per US dollar 
between 1995 and mid-1998 reduced the prices for imported products in the domestic market. This was 
furthered  by  a  decrease  in  the  level  of  tariff  protection.  This  had  the  most  adverse  effect  on  cattle 
breeding. By 1998 the imports of meat amounted to 33 per cent of its consumption. The imports of milk 
powder and dairy products lowered the production of milk, as well as profitability thereof. Meat cattle 
breeding, raising and fattening of cattle and poultry in particular, became unprofitable. In 1996-1998 the 
profitability of milk production was between -35 (minus 35) per cent and – 42 (minus 42) per cent, while 
the profitability of meat production amounted between – 40 (minus 40) per cent for pork production and – 
60  (minus  60)  per  cent  for  cattle.  As  most  farms  were  involved  in  both  crop  production  and  cattle 
breeding, agriculture in general became unprofitable. 
 
This unprofitability was for the government the reason to withdraw from any support of agriculture. The 
governmental  authorities  started  calling  agriculture  ‘a  black  hole’.  The  generally  known  sectoral 
specificity of agriculture, familiar to any qualified economist, that make such support necessary were not 
taken  into  account  by  market  fundamentalists.  However,  there  was  still  certain  ‘pragmatic’  support, 
although constantly decreasing, of agricultural producers due to corresponding demands from the State 
Duma [Parliament] dominated by left-wing parties. 
 
The share of expenditures for the state support of agriculture in the consolidated budget decreased from 
15 per cent in 1991 to 2.7 per cent in 1998. In this period 13 per cent of the population were employed in 
agriculture, while the share of agriculture in GDP in 1997-98 amounted to 6 per cent. By 1996-98 the 
share of subsidies in the revenue of agricultural enterprises amounted to 10.5-11 per cent, decreasing 
down to 7.2 per cent in the total costs. Interestingly, evaluating the level of state support of the prices for 
agricultural production by the price subsidy equivalent indicator, as of 1995 Russia was at the level of 
developed countries. The reason for that was that the ruble exchange rate in this period was seriously 
overstated.  
 
Table 1: Level of price subsidies of agricultural producers, in per cent
5 
Countries  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
Russia  -26  -9  21  32  26 
Canada  31  25  22  22  20 
ЕС
6   49  48  49  43  42 
Check Republic  27  21  15  14  11 
Hungary  24  31  21  15  16 
Poland  15  20  19  23  22 
USA   23  19  13  15  16 
Estonia  -30  -6  3  7  9 
Latvia  -38  9  8  7  8 
Lithuania  -33  -8  6  14  18 
 
                                                 
4 Compared to the pre-reform year of 1991, by 1998 prices for industrial production consumed by agricultural producers grew 
by 5 times more than those for agricultural production.   
5 Source: Reviews of Agricultural Policies. Russian Federation. OECD. 1998., PP. 189, 264, 272.      
6 ЕС – 12  till 1994, ЕС – 15 since 1995.     6 
In this situation net investment in agricultural production almost stopped, with the withdrawal of main 
assets exceeding their inflow by four times. By the end of 1998, the total debts of agricultural enterprises 
exceeded annual revenues by 52 per cent, with the coefficient of own circulating assets supply decreased 
from 36 per cent in 1995 down to – 20 (minus 20) per cent in 1998. 
 
At the same time, despite the situation of market competition, the efficiency of agricultural production did 
not increase over the period of ‘market fundamentalism’ domination in Russia. We evaluated the costs 
per unit of gross output in the comparable prices of 1995 and
7. It turned out that the costs per unit of 
output in 1995 exceeded the costs of 1990 by 42.7 per cent (in the prices of 1990), while the costs per unit 
of gross output in 1998 exceeded the costs of 1995 by 3 per cent
8. We can see here that after a sharp 
decline in efficiency, in 1996-98 enterprises somewhat adapted to the new situation. However, the overall 
increase in cost per unit in comparable prices amounted to 47 per cent in 1998. Thus as a result of the first 
stage of reforms, lasting seven years and over in 1998, the expectations of those who treated market 
relations as an aim, not as a means, were not justified either in terms of growth of agricultural production, 
or in terms of increase in efficiency.  
6. MODERATE MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM AND AGRICULTURE AFTER 2000 
It is common knowledge that on 18 August 1998 the Government of Russia declared itself insolvent, i.e. 
incapable of repaying its debts, at the same time ‘releasing’ the dollar, which led to a radical change in the 
macroeconomic situation in the country, as well as to changing the Government. The living standards of 
the  population  again  decreased  by  approximately  two  times.  However,  the  Primakov  Government, 
pragmatic and strange to ‘market fundamentalism’, was strikingly fast in tackling most difficult issues of 
the socio-economic crisis and providing the economy with circulating assets, repaying wage arrears and 
eliminating a significant share of the accumulated non-payments between enterprises. It was apparently 
for this reason that this Government was dismissed by President Yeltsin, who himself soon resigned 
having nominated Vladimir Putin as the successor. 
 
The macroeconomic situation was characterized by an increase in the dollar exchange rate, followed by 
the cost of all imported products, by 3-4 times over a few weeks from August 1998, which made all 
imports, including imported foodstuffs, inaccessible to the majority of the population for a long period of 
time. This immediately ‘made room’ for the Russian producers both in the economy in general, and in the 
agrarian  sector  in  particular.  The  prices  for  domestic  products,  including  foodstuffs  and  agricultural 
products, significantly increased, while the salaries were growing at a much slower pace. In 1998 the 
growth of agricultural and foodstuff prices was even faster than that of the prices for industrial products. 
This means that the revenue of agricultural and processing enterprises radically increased, with a much 
slower growth of costs. Over 50 per cent of agricultural and processing enterprises became profitable over 
a few months. This made them attractive for investment. The capital of various sectors, including that 
gained by importing foodstuffs, accumulated in earlier years was being actively invested in the processing 
industry and later, with the objective of ensuring supplies of raw resources, in agriculture. 
This created good macroeconomic conditions for growth, which even further improved after a 50 per cent 
increase in the oil prices in the world market in 2000 with their subsequent growth. 
 
However, the increase in the oil prices led to excessive money supply, which the new government, afraid 
of a growth of inflation rate, did not find appropriate to use within the country. Market fundamentalism 
demonstrated itself at the macrolevel by an  attempt to ‘sterilize’, i.e. to withdraw from using in the 
economy, the enormous resources gained from oil and gas. Nevertheless, starting with 2003, US dollar 
                                                 
7 This indicator can be treated as ‘total factor productivity index’.  
8 D. Epstein, 2001. Financial crisis  of agricultural enterprises  in Russia// International Agricultural Journal, Issue 3, 2001. PP. 
20-21. On Russian. (Эпштейн Д.Б., 2001. Финансовый кризис сельскохозяйственных предприятий России.//  Между-
народный сельскохозяйственный журнал. № 3. 2001. С. 20-21). 
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began falling in price due to excessive dollar supply in relation to import demands. Together with dollar, 
less expensive became the imported goods. It repeated the situation of 1995-98. 
 
Market  fundamentalism  also  maintained  in  the  sphere  of  the  agrarian  sector,  too.  Among  its 
manifestations were: 1) earlier practices of reducing state support for agriculture compared to budgetary 
expenditures – they fell from 2.5 per cent in 1998 to 1 per cent in 2006; 2) withdrawal from legally 
establishing any system of state regulation of agriculture with clear objectives and tools.  
However, due to an increasing interest of the Russian society and the President in developing domestic 
production,  market  fundamentalists  became  more  careful  and  moderate  in  denying  the  needs  of 
agriculture presented actively by the Ministry for Agriculture.  
Starting with June 2002, the Ministry for Agriculture initiated the implementation of a financial recovery 
program for agricultural enterprises, which was in writing off penalty fees, and fines of the enterprises. 
They  had  to  take  the  obligations  of  timely  repayment  of  their  current  debts  and  to  carry  out  these 
obligations. Agricultural enterprises were allowed to shift to the so called ‘unified agricultural tax’ which, 
in fact, resulted in a certain decrease of tax burden and a simplification of the taxation system. The state 
introduced subsidies to cover the interest for short-term loans for agricultural producers at the level of two 
thirds of the Central Bank rate. This made the loans used more widely. 
 
Starting with 2000, the agrarian policy on the  whole might be called the policy of forced minimum 
support in the situation of anticipatory growth of foodstuff imports. The support was at the minimum 
level  since  it  allowed  keeping  an  average  profitability  slightly  above  zero,  but  the  only  noticeably 
expanding form of this support was subsidizing the interest for the loans. Quotas for poultry imports and 
higher taxation for raw sugar imports were also used. Both measures of import restriction had a positive 
impact on the dynamics of output of these products. This support was forced because otherwise we 
would have witnessed an absolute decrease in the agricultural output, which would adversely affect the 
image of the authorities.  
 
However  the  key  issue  –  ensuring  the  profitability  of  agriculture  at  a  level  sufficient  for  production 
development and stable growth – was not tackled. The average ratio of the profits (including subsidies) to 
the revenue over the period between 2000 and 2004 amounted to 4.7 per cent, while the ratio of the 
profits to the self-cost of the products sold amounted to 5.1 per cent, which was too low to provide for a 
sustainable growth. As a result, the agricultural output growth rate decreased from 6.4 per cent in 1999-
2001 to 2.1 per cent in 2002-2005, with the cattle breeding output decreasing by 3 per cent over 2003 and 
2004 and increasing by a marginal 0.3 per cent in 2005 accompanied by a very high livestock decreasing 
rate. Such growth can hardly be called sustainable. 
7. DECREASE IN RESOURCE POTENTIAL AND GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY 
Together with the unsustainable growth rates, one can witness a sustainable high rate of decreasing the 
resource potential of agricultural enterprises. The number of employees decreased almost twofold from 
1998 to 2004 and continues shrinking at the rate of over 10 per cent a year; the agricultural land reduced 
by 13 per cent, i.e. by 30 million hectares; cultivated areas of agricultural enterprises decreased by 28 per 
cent, i.e. by 22.3 million hectares, over these six years. The circulating assets of the enterprises included 
in  the  statistics  of  the  Ministry  for  Agriculture,  in  comparable  prices,  decreased,  according  to  our 
estimates,  by  37.9  per  cent.  Despite  a  certain  investment  growth,  the  fixed  assets  of  agricultural 
enterprises,  in  the  prices  of  1998,  reduced  by  23.1  per  cent  by  2004.  Since  2001  the  number  of 
agricultural enterprises has also been decreasing very fast (by up to 10 per cent a  year), while their 
resources are not being transferred to other enterprises, as such an overall reduction of resources would 
not take place otherwise. 
 
Let us turn to the situation with the productive efficiency, i.e. with the dynamics of costs per unit of gross 
output, in comparable prices. It can be expected that, under a very tough pressure of the disparity of 
prices, the surviving agricultural enterprises were able to adapt to this situation after 1998 and achieve a 
decrease in the costs per unit of output. Out estimates support this hypothesis (see Table 2). 
   8 
Table 2: Dynamics of self-cost of a unit of gross agricultural output in comparable    
prices of the earlier period in 1990-2004 in Russia, per cent 
 









2004 in % 
of 1999 
Self-cost  of  a  unit  of  gross  agricultural 
output in comparable prices, in % 
142.7  103  91  72.1 
Source: Own estimates 
 
Obviously, in 1999 agricultural enterprises were able to overcome the tendency of increasing use of 
resources per unit and then started to increase productive efficiency at a fairly high pace (over 5 per cent a 
year). This efficiency growth is partially caused not only by a growth of efficiency in active enterprises, 
but  also  by  withdrawal  of  the  least  effective  enterprises  and  their  resources.  We  carried  out  an 
approximate estimation of efficiency growth and in particular due to withdrawal of weak enterprises on 
the basis of data from the Leningrad Region (Oblast).  
8. DYNAMICS OF GROWTH OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN THE LENINGRAD OBLAST  
The Leningrad Oblast is among the most successful in the country in terms of the pace of productivity 
growth in cattle breeding at agricultural enterprises
9. The agrarian policy in the Leningrad Region can 
certainly  be  also  characterized  as  a  policy  of  forced  minimum  support,  as  the  government  of  the 
Leningrad Oblast does not go beyond minor subsidies, up to an average of 6 per cent of the revenue of an 
enterprise.  Most  subsidies  go  to  relatively  strong  enterprises.  Weaker  enterprises  also  receive  some 
support.  For  instance,  there  is  a  program  of  supporting  enterprises  in  disadvantageous  areas.  The 
Leningrad  Region  participated  in  the  financial  recovery  program.  The  Region  does  not  apply  any 
measures that would limit market development.  
 
The  agriculture  of  the  region  is  significantly  influenced  by  the  constantly  growing  demand  of  the 
population of St.Petersburg for foodstuffs (due to growing incomes), as well as a competition in the labor 
market of the city’s industrial enterprises with relatively high wages. Influence and competition on the 
part of the neighboring regions (Vologda and Novgorod Regions, Central Russia) that also produce milk, 
poultry, vegetables, as well as competition on the part of imported dairy, meat and vegetable products can 
also be found.  
 
The said stable situation, with weak support from the state and high level of competition on the part of the 
imports, influenced the resource potential and efficiency of enterprises in the following way. According 
to the general report of the Committee for Agroindustrial Complex for the said period of three years, the 
number  of  workers  employed  by  agricultural  enterprises  decreased  by  30.5  per  cent.  The  area  of 
agricultural land reduced by 20.9 per cent, the area of cultivated land – by 23 per cent, irrigated areas 
decreased by 30 per cent, while drained areas reduced by 15.4 per cent. The number of tractors fell by 30 
per cent, with the quantity of trucks decreased by 13.7 per cent. A fairly fast decrease in the resource 
potential of agricultural enterprises is also obvious
10.   
 
A  comparison  of  resources  used  and  the  output  using  the  general  reports  of  2001  and  2004  in  the 
comparable prices of 2001 gives the following results, rather interesting in our opinion: total expenditures 
(total self-cost in comparable prices) decreased by 9 per cent over three years; total output measured in 
the average regional prices of 2001 increased by 26.1 per cent, while the output per unit of resources 
                                                 
9 By the end of 2005, the milk yield in the region amounted to 6240 kilos per cow, with the country average figure being 3280 
kilos.   
10 In Leningrad Oblast in 2004 the corporate farms y produced over 64 per cent of gross agricultural output comparing with the 
country’ average of 42 per cent.     9 
increased by 38.6 per cent
11.  The growth of sales was generally achieved due to hothouse vegetables, 
cattle meat and poultry. Table 3 below contains the data on the extent of decrease in the number of 
enterprises producing certain products and of increase in production concentration. 
 
Table 3: Growth of production concentration in the Leningrad Region in 2001-2004 
 
Products  Quantity of producers, 
enterprises 
Quantity of largest producers on 
aggregate giving 50 per cent or 
more 
  2001  2004  2001  2004 
Grain   106  83  14  8 
Potatoes  155  116  21  16 
Vegetables  66  46  5  5 
Milk    166  126  35  34 
Dairy products  36  23  6  4 
 
To evaluate the growth of efficiency of the surviving enterprises we organized a panel data analysis of the 
aggregate of 126 enterprises functioning in 2001 and 2004. Using the least-squares method, we plotted a 
Cobb-Douglas production function for the output on 6 factors on the aggregate of 2001-2004 with the 
data reduced to the prices of 2001 and with the time factor (neutral technological progress). By its form, 
the production function is a usual Cobb-Douglas function with y for output, t for the independent time 
factor and X for the vector of inputs: 
y (X, t) = Ce
at X
b   with  a and b being the required function parameters. The equation demonstrated a 
serious increase in technical efficiency in 2004 compared to 2001, at the rate of over 6 per cent annually 
(see below). 
 
Table 4. Coefficients and statistical evaluation of production function for the 
Leningrad Region in 2001-2004 
 






- criterion  Significance 
Constant  0,2699  0,257  1,051  0,2944 
Ln (labor, average number of the 
workers, persons)  0,106  0,053  2,002  0,046 
Ln (material cost minus cost of 
fodder, thou. Ruble)  0,442  0,056  7,920  0,000 
Ln (cost of machines, equipment, 
transport means, thou. Ruble)  0,002  0,023  0,073  0,942 
Ln (agricultural area, ha)   0,080  0,017  4,563  0,000 
Ln (concentrates, thou. fodder units)   0,274  0,028  9,711  0,000 
Ln (other fodder, thou. fodder units)  0,171  0,046  3,737  0,000 
T (time, year)  0,063  0,012  5,349  0,000 
n  252       
df (degrees of freedom)  7       
R
2  0,969       
F - criterion  895,1       
Durbin-Watson-criterion  1,964       
                                                 
11 Production output was estimated as a sum of all products sold in the comparable prices of 2001, the same for all enterprises.    10 
Standard error   0,196       
 
With the average annual rate of neutral efficiency growth of 6.3 per cent a year, its growth over three 
years amounts to 20.1 per cent. This means that over half of the 38.6 per cent growth of productive 
efficiency was achieved as a result of growth of efficiency of active enterprises, with the almost other half 
being the result of withdrawal of less effective enterprises. 
 
Obviously, the efficiency growth in the Leningrad Region was noticeably ahead the average efficiency 
growth in Russia. We can also see a significant economy of scale: with the increase in production volume 
by 1 per cent, the output is growing by 1.075 per cent
12, even without considering technological progress. 
Thus the outcome of ‘moderate market fundamentalism’ in the region of such a big city of St.Petersburg 
was also ambivalent, as in Russia in general. On the one hand, there was a significant increase in the 
efficiency of using resources. On the other hand, due to weak support there was a serious decrease in the 
number of agricultural enterprises, as well as in the labor and land resources used by them. 
9. WHAT’S NEXT? ABOUT A VISION OF AGRARIAN POLICY WITHOUT MARKET 
FUNDAMENTALISM 
In order to correspond to the objectives of the country in the situation of globalization and to achieve 
efficiency  growth  in  combination  with  an  increase  in  both  production  and  consumption,  market 
fundamentalism in agrarian policy should be abandoned. In our opinion: 1) the total expenditures for 
support  shall  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  the  objective  of  providing  conditions  for  extended 
reproduction of foodstuffs and increasing the competitiveness of the products, including that in the world 
market
13; 2) forms of support shall ensure the profitability necessary for extended reproduction in the 
sphere of commodity production, as well as narrowing the gap between wages in agriculture and wages in 
industry, at the same time distorting the market prices of the production to the lowest degree possible; 3) 
the  level  of  protection  of  the  domestic  market  from  the  imports  shall  be  determined  by  the  internal 
objectives of agrarian policy.  
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